Annals of the „Ovidius" University of Constanța – Political Science Series
Analele Universității „Ovidius" din Constanța – Seria Științe Politice
Volume 11 (2022): 89-128

THE LIMITS OF THE EU'S NORMATIVE POWER ON INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION EFFORTS. CASE-STUDY: THE INTERACTION WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Emilian-Marian STOICA*

Received: May 31, 2022 Accepted for publication: October 15, 2022

Abstract: When it comes to climate change mitigation, both the European Union (EU) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are regarded as the main actors driving international efforts, but for different reasons. While the EU's status as a climate change champion is based on its ability to regulate and set high international norms and standards, the PRC is one of the world's great powers that have the economic and technological resources and the capacity needed to significantly reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. Benefiting from its institutional and regulatory framework, the EU seeks through its foreign policy and other cooperation mechanisms to persuade other international actors, such as the PRC, to adapt their climate change policies to European demands in this area. In this paper, I analyze the normative power of the EU over the PRC in fighting climate change, and I will argue why the Brussels efforts to mitigate the speed of the global climate change after the signing of the Paris Agreement (PA) are only partially supplemented by those of the PRC. The reason why EU's influence on Beijing's climate change policy is limited has to do with the PRC's own ambition on this issue, which is driven by its great power aspirations.

Keywords: Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, climate change, Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, People's Republic of China, Emissions Trading System, European Union, EU Green Deal, Fit for 55, normative power, Paris Agreement

◊◊◊

Rezumat: Când vine vorba de atenuarea schimbărilor climatice, atât Uniunea Europeană (UE), cât şi Republica Populară Chineză (RPC) sunt considerate principalii actori ai eforturilor internaţionale, dar din motive diferite. În timp ce statutul UE de campion al schimbărilor climatice se bazează pe capacitatea sa de a reglementa şi de a stabili norme şi standarde internaţionale înalte, RPC este una dintre marile puteri ale lumii care deţine atât resursele cât şi capacitatea economică şi tehnologică necesară pentru a reduce semnificativ emisiile globale de gaze cu efect de seră. Beneficiind de cadrul său instituţional şi de reglementare, UE încearcă, prin politica sa externă şi prin alte mecanisme de cooperare, să convingă alţi actori internaţionali, precum RPC, să îşi

* Emilian-Marian Stoica, PhD Student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA), Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: stoicaemilian.es@gmail.com

adapteze politicile privind schimbările climatice la cerinţele europene în acest domeniu. În acest studiu, analizez puterea normativă a UE asupra RPC în combaterea schimbărilor climatice şi voi argumenta de ce eforturile Bruxellesului de a atenua viteza schimbărilor climatice globale după semnarea Acordului de la Paris sunt doar parţial completate de cele ale RPC. Motivul pentru care influenţa UE asupra politicii Beijingului privind schimbările climatice este limitată este dat de ambiţia RPC în această problemă, care este condusă de aspiraţiile sale mari de putere.
Cuvinte cheie: Mecanismul de ajustare la frontieră în funcţie de carbon, schimbare climatică, Acordul Comprehensiv de Investiţii, Republica Populară Chineză, Sistemul de comercializare a certificatelor de emisii, Uniunea Europeană, Pactul verde european, Pregătiţi pentru 55, putere normativă, Acordul de la Paris

I. Introduction

The EU and the PRC can both be regarded as great powers that are working to promote their values across their borders. Recently, the rise of the PRC changed the picture of international politics due to the fact that the Chinese view their place in the world completely differently. While the EU operates internally as well as in its foreign policy as a supranational democracy, promoting its interests and values under the auspices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in close consultation with the European External Action Service, the PRC is a highly centralized state, with a more rigid decision-making process that is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Among the EU's main purposes, there is the necessity to increase cohesion between Member States and to maintain a high standard of living for the European citizens. On the other hand, one of Beijing's goals is to maintain the loyalty of Chinese citizens towards the CCP through the existence of a functioning economy, which, because of its complexity and size, is vulnerable to any element that might disturb it.[1] The difference in their policies is also determined by the values that underlie their general framework, and these values inherently have implications on foreign policy decisions. The central values of the EU are defined by the *acquis communautaire* and have a liberal character influenced by the common European culture of the Member States. The interaction between the EU and the PRC is one of the most dynamic and relevant ones of the 21st century international politics. After surpassing Japan in terms of GDP in 2010, the PRC

[1] Alanna Krolikowski, "Brittle China? Economic and Political Fragility with Global Implications," *Global Policy* 8, no. 4 (June 2017): 43.

became the second largest economy in the world.[2] At the same time, the EU is the world's largest single market with a GDP of $17,09 trillion and a population of almost 447 million people.[3] Even if the PRC has a very distinct political identity among the other actors of the international arena, described by its influential culture and communist political organization of the state, it is one of the most important international actors that has been highly influenced by the normative power (NP) of the EU when it comes to its involvment in global action to reduce the pace of climate change.

In the first part of the paper, I will present the concept of NP and its relevant meanings in the context of this analysis. I will argue why the EU is a NP in setting international standards for combating climate change and how sustainable development has become the core value of European environmental policy. In this section, I will also explain how the EU exercises its NP over the PRC in order to make it pursue higher standards in its climate change policy. In developing the methodological framework, I will adopt the theoretical model provided by Ian Manners by using in the process of analysis the diffusion of norms in its various forms. In the second part of this paper, I will examine the effects of EU's NP on the PRC's own approach on climate change by analysing the political discourse of the Chinese leaders, their willingness to be actively involved in the joint efforts of the international community to limit greenhouse gas emissions, and the PRC's domestic and foreign environmental policy measures that are meant to reduce its contribution to global warming in accordance with international targets.

II. The Theoretical Model of Normative Power: The Case of Europe

In 2002, Ian Manners proposed the concept of normative power as a new way of understanding how the EU acts in its international relations and how it sets the agenda for what is *normal* in the international arena.[4] According to

[2] Mireya Solis, "China, Japan, and the Art of Economic Statecraft," *Brookings*, February 2020, 2, accessed August 27, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FP_202002_china_japan_solis.pdf.

[3] The World Bank, "European Union", 2022, accessed August 27, 2022, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=EU.

[4] Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002).

Manners, "the concept of normative power, in its ideal or purest form, is ideational rather than material or physical" and "its uses involve normative justification rather than the use of material incentives of physical force".[5] Manners confirms his ideas about the EU understood as a NP, emphasizing that it "promotes a series of normative principles that are generally acknowledged, within the United Nations system, to be universally applicable".[6]

This concept was the subject of many international relations academic debates for the last fifteen years but, despite this fact, in most cases it was used only to explain how the EU shapes the behavior of the other actors on the international stage. Manners considers that "it is possible to think of the ideational impact of the EU's international identity/role as representing normative power".[7] The elements that outline the normative specifics of the EU on the global stage are the historical context that defined the evolution of the EU, its hybrid polity as both "supranational and international forms of government that transcends westphalian norms"[8], and its constitutional configuration working as an "elite-driven, treaty based, and legal order" and whose norms are shaping the EU's international identity.[9]

Manners' theory on how the power of the EU manifests on the world's political stage is meant to fill the gaps generated by the impossibility of theorists to set a comprehensive image of the EU's foreign policy in the terms of conventional power. Manners suggests that the relationship between normative and material power, economic or military, does not imply that the use of one of the two determines the exclusion of the other, since in practice the two are used together, the normative power having the role of justifying the use of material power.[10] The exercise of normative power is achieved through the process of diffusion of norms which can take six distinct forms: contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, and cultural filter.[11]

As a NP, the EU promote nine values/principles through its foreign policy: sustainable peace, social freedom, consensual democracy, associative human

[5] Ian Manners, "The EU's Normative Power in Changing World Politics," in *Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion*, ed. Andre Gerrits (Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2009), 11, accessed August 27, 2022, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20091200_cesp_paper_gerrits.pdf.
[6] Ian Manners, "The normative ethics of the European Union," *International Affair* 84, no. 1(2008): 46.
[7] Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 238.
[8] Ibid., 240.
[9] Ibid., 241.
[10] Manners, "The EU's Normative Power," 15.
[11] Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 244-245.

rights, supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance. These normative principles are "those which EU members states, institutions and citizens are willing to stand up for, or at least, not knock down".[12] Also, the NP of the EU resides in its ability to set rules beyond its border and shape the behavior of other international players according to its values that inform those rules. Moreover, this ability is based on the overall capacity of the EU to rally its Member States around common goals, to face the challenges on common ground and to manage in concert in matters related to foreign affairs. This characteristic of the EU makes it a unique actor in the international arena.

Regarding the subject of this paper, the statement of Hanna Tuominen highlights a defining aspect of the NP and its relation with the moral issues debated at the international level of politics. She argues that "the normative power role seems to be especially relevant in policy areas that include moral questions like climate change, development and human rights" and that the legitimacy of EU's NP is based on the way it manages these areas.[13] Following this line of argument, we can consider that the analysis of NP can intersect with the analysis of soft power because the values mentioned by Tuominen are strongly embraced by the developed democracies in which citizens are aware of their value in a society. The EU diffuses its norms by the power of example, and this is why Manners highlights the fact that "the notion of a normative power Europe is located in a discussion of power over opinion".[14]

This manifestation of EU's NP in contemporary politics determined some scholars in the field of international law and international relations to speak about the EU as a regulatory power or a global regulatory hegemon. Anu Bradford argues that the EU as a NP is "wielding influence through promoting norms that are based on values such as human rights and sustainable development. It emphasizes the EU's self-identification as righteous power that acts in normatively justified and principled ways in the international arena".[15] The clearest example of how NP works is the case of EU's enlargement to include the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states. In the pre-accession

[12] Manners, "The normative ethics," 48.
[13] Hanna Tuominen, "The Changing Context of Global Governance and the Normative Power of the European Union," in *Global Power Europe – Vol. 1*, ed. Astrid Boening, and Jan-Frederik Kremer (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), 216.
[14] Manners, "Normative Power Europe", 239.
[15] Anu Bradford, *The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 21.

stage of the CEE states, the EU used the legitimacy of its core values to export its norms in those countries that aspired to be considered consolidated democracies defined by the respect for the rule of law, the separation of powers and the protection of human rights.

III. EU's Normative Power over the PRC on Climate Change

The dynamics between the EU and the PRC regarding climate change mitigation can only be understood in relation to the climate change international regime. The mitigation of climate change, as well as in the case of many other areas of common interest for members of the international society, has materialized in the form of an international regime whose main purpose is to fight global warming in order to keep humanity safe from its effects and to preserve the current state of the planet as a whole. The climate change international regime provides the core principles and guidelines for action that are integrated in the political positions of the participants in this regime. According to Kate O'Neill, international efforts to fight climate change as an international environmental problem are generally focused on the "increased atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) – including carbon dioxide and methane, as a result of human activity, notably the burning of fossil fuels; expected to lead to a rise in the overall global temperatures, with regional variation".[16] The consequences of global warming can be seen in "sea-level rise and coastal zone flooding (as polar ice-caps melt), widespread ecosystems and land use change and possible violent weather patterns, human health impacts".[17] The PA is currently at the heart of the international climate change regime and sets the highest targets and standards for limiting climate change to date.

The PA was adopted in 2015 and is the first international agreement accepted, on voluntary basis, by all the international actors whose intense economic activity is the primary source of global warming. In continuation of Kyoto Protocol, the PA is a more ambitious project due to the specific ways in which it establishes the importance of the contribution of all parties to the achievement of the target to limit global warming to no more than 1.5°C

[16] Kate O'Neill, *The Environment and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 34.
[17] Ibid.

compared to pre-industrial levels. In order reach this target – as set by the PA – emissions need to be reduced by 45% by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050.[18] Today 194 states have signed the PA and 191 states and the EU have ratified this agreement.[19] In this regard, another important achievement of the PA is the fact that it managed for the first time in history to bring together the world's two biggest contributors to GHGs: the United States of America and the PRC.

During the PA's negotiations, the developed states requested that every country should match their efforts to reduce their emissions in accordance with their economic circumstances, meaning that, "in principle, emerging economies whose emissions rise in line with economic growth can no longer hide behind their official developing country status and are expected to make a bigger contribution to global climate change mitigation".[20] When analyzing the impact of EU's NP on the PRC in matters regarding climate change mitigation we must consider two elements. The first one is the regulatory capacity of NP that implies the establishment and enforcement of the non-mandatory international norms and targets as they are set by the regime in question. The second element refers to how every participant in this regime applies the norms and rules of the regime and supports the international efforts to combat the global warming by investing large amounts of resources in carbon neutral energy sources and technologies.

Today the EU is one of the main defenders of the rules-based international order, based on global initiatives such as the Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order[21], and probably even the most vocal. The international regime regarding the mitigation of climate change is an important part of the international order and the EU plays a rather essential role in it, being a model worth following for the rest of the international community. As was noted in Manners and Bradford's arguments, on the international stage, sustainable development is one of the values on which the EU's regulatory power is based.

---

[18] United Nations – Climate Action, "For a livable climate: Net-zero commitments must be backed by credible action," *United Nations*, n.d., accessed September 9, 2022, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition.

[19] United Nations – Climate Change, "Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification", n.d., accessed March 20, 2021, https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification.

[20] Robert Falker, "The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics," *International Affairs* 92, no. 5 (2016): 1116.

[21] General Assembly of the United Nations, "3202 (S-VI). Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order," UN Documents, May 1, 1974, accessed August 20, 2022, http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3202.htm .

The international climate change mitigation regime has evolved during the last 40 years, so has the European climate change policy and, by analysing the EU's treaties and regulations, we will understand the normative values/principles at the basis of this policy. There is one central principle that has legitimized EU's NP in the field of climate change mitigation and on which its promoted international standards for environmental protection are based. Article 192(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) delineates the principles of the EU's environmental policy. These are: the precautionary principle; the prevention principle; the rectification at source principle, and the polluter pays principle.[22] But there is a fifth EU environmental principle that is not mentioned in Article 192(2) of TFEU: the sustainable development principle which was first introduced as part of EU regulations by the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). Even if the TFEU established the four aforementioned principles to guide the environmental policy between EU Member States in the area of international environmental cooperation, the EU is primarily using sustainable development as the core principle.

The Single European Act (1987) provided the legal basis for environmental protection to become a goal of the European integration project by inserting an environmental title into the Treaty, but the Maastricht Treaty (1992) enhanced the decision-making regarding environmental protection. According to Article 130r of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union), one of the objectives of the environmental policy was to "promote measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems".[23] Starting with the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), environmental protection became an inherent element of all EU policy areas, while, at the same time, sustainable development acquired a central role among the policy objectives of European institutions.[24]

Between the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty there are two important moments for the evolution of sustainable development as a core value/principle of the EU's climate policy. The first one is the 2000 Lisbon

[22] EUR-Lex, "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union," October 26, 2012, accessed March 15, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=ro.
[23] EUR-Lex, "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union," October 26, 2012, accessed March 26, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.
[24] EUR-Lex, "Treaty of Amsterdam,", October 2, 1997, 25, accessed March 17, 2021, https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/default/files/docs/body/treaty_of_amsterdam_en.pdf.

European Council, whose conclusions set "a new strategic goal" for the next ten years that was "to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion".[25] Secondly, the conclusions of the 2001 Goteborg European Council highlight that "sustainable development […] is a fundamental objective under the Treaties […] That requires dealing with economic, social and environmental policies in mutually reinforcing way".[26] The Lisbon Treaty (2009) adds climate change to the Treaty objectives and gives sustainable development a leading role in the Union's foreign policy by fostering cooperation at the international level in order to "help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development".[27]

Along with the emphasis on promoting sustainable development as a core principle of its foreign policy, the EU owns one of the most complex mechanisms for taxing greenhouse gas emissions from economic activity. At first, EU Member States had opposed the proposed mechanism of 1997 Kyoto Protocol because of the emissions pricing systems, but it did not take long until the EU took concrete and determined action to cut GHG emissions. Among the reasons behind the development of the European market for green certificates were the decisions of Member States such as the United Kingdom and Denmark to develop state-wide emissions trading schemes (ETS).[28] The EU ETS system was adopted as part of the EU environment policy in 2003, entered into force in 2005, and became one of the most important European climate policy instruments aimed at reducing GHG emissions. Also, the EU ETS system is the world's largest carbon pricing market, covering power and heat generation, energy-intensive industrial sectors, and aviation within Europe This climate change mitigation instrument is a carbon market trade scheme system whose role is to set up a limit on total emissions by making the companies

[25] European Parliament, "Lisbon European Council," March 24, 2000, accessed March 25, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm.
[26] European Council, "Presidency Conclusions: Goteborg European Council," *European Council*, June 15 and 16, 2001, 4, accessed March 27, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20983/00200-r1en1.pdf.
[27] EUR-Lex, "Treaty of Lisbon," December 17, 2007, 24, accessed March 22, 2021, http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/688a7a98-3110-4ffe-a6b3-8972d8445325.0007.01/DOC_19.
[28] Frank J. Convery, "Origins and Development of the EU ETS," *Environmental and Resource Economics* 43, no. 3 (2009), 401.

which contribute to GHG emissions buy and sell emission certificates (generically called green certificates) in order to compensate for their own carbon footprint. By 2019, more than 15.000 power plants and factories were trading EU ETS certificates in the European Economic Area, accounting for almost half of EU's GHGs emissions.[29]

In some EU Member States, the carbon pricing practice is not limited just to the EU ETS system, given the fact that it only covers 40% of EU GHG emissions. For the remaining 60% of GHGs emitted at the EU level as a result of road transport, heating of buildings, agriculture, small industrial installations and waste management activities, the EU climate and energy package is completed by the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR).[30] This policy framework established in 2018 by the European Commission (EC) sets up a shared reduction of 30% of GHGs at EU level. Thus, in order to implement the ESR, each EU Member State must take measures in order to generate national reductions of GHGs by 2030 by up to 40%, compared to the 2005 level. The individual obligations of the Member States deriving from the ESR are established and differentiated according to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, because the regulation establishing this instrument is guided by the principles of "fairness, cost-effectiveness and environmental integrity."[31]

One of the tools currently used by several EU Member States to meet their GHG reduction targets of the ESR is the direct taxation of carbon resulting from non-ETS activities. Direct carbon tax schemes were first developed in the 1990s by the Nordic states. Finland was the first European state to implement a direct carbon tax in 1990.[32] In the following years, several European states elaborated similar schemes and currently they are implemented in a number of

[29] Investigate Europe, "EU Emissions Trading Scheme Explained," August 6, 2020, accessed March 17, 2021, https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/2020/eu-emissions-trading-scheme-explained/?ie_s=ga&pk_campaign=en_dsa&pk_source=google&pk_medium=cpc&gclid=Cj0KCQjw1PSDBhDbARIsAPeTqrddxPrkNSwnhQYLKqSsE43T0WfJROZ5VCJ7XCkjdPgTIpu0fV9W8xIaAtL6EALw_wcB.

[30] European Commission, "Effort sharing 2021-2030: targets and flexibilities," *European Commission*, n.d., accessed August 27, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/effort-sharing-member-states-emission-targets/effort-sharing-2021-2030-targets-and-flexibilities_en.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Jeremy Wates, *A carbon pricing blueprint for the EU* (Brussels: European Environmental Bureau, 2021), 12, accessed August 27, 2022, https://eeb.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/A-Carbon-Pricing-Blueprint-for-the-EU2.pdf.

14 Member States, including France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain.[33]

If in the case of the EU's ETS system there is a mechanism by which those who emit GHGs are determined to pay for air pollution, in the case of direct carbon taxation the developments are not so obvious. This is due to the fact that direct carbon taxation is carried out individually at the level of each Member State that opts for this practice and, therefore, its rigidity is determined by the sovereign decision of each state. In the absence of European price ceilings for non-ETS sectors, established in the EU legislation and adapted by the Member States, direct taxation of carbon in the EU is carried out differently depending on the national climate change policy ambitions.[34] Currently, in the case of these countries, the price of the direct carbon tax varies between $0.08/ton of CO2 emitted (Poland) and $129.89/ton of CO2 emitted (Sweden).[35]

Despite these shortcomings, the EU clearly represents a good example to follow in terms of the taxation of GHG emissions, both because it has a fairly comprehensive ETS scheme both in terms of volume and in terms of areas of economic activity, and also because it regulates as efficiently as possible the emissions of those economic sectors not covered by this scheme. Moreover, the experience of the 14 EU Member States that use parallel direct systems for charging emissions is revealing in that it established the image of the EU as a global leader in the field of charging GHG emissions. According to a study by Grantham Institute of Imperial College London, 39 national and 23 sub-national jurisdictions have implemented or are scheduled to implement carbon pricing instruments, and the EU ETS market is the best model to pursue this endeavor.[36]

The PRC is one of the countries that has benefited from the EU's support and expertise in implementing an ETS system. But the PRC's cooperation with the EU is taking place in a broader framework of relations. EU cooperation

[33] European Court of Auditors, "Energy taxation, carbon pricing and energy subsidies," *European Court of Auditors*, 2022, accessed September 4, 2022, https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/RW22_01/RW_Energy_taxation_EN.pdf, 18.
[34] Ibid., 21.
[35] The World Bank, "Carbon Pricing Dashboard," *The World Bank*, n.d., accessed September 4, 2022, https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/map_data.
[36] Mirabelle Muuls et al., "Evaluating the EU Emissions Trading System: Take it or leave it? An assessment of the data after ten years," Grantham Institute Briefing paper, no. 21, October 2016, accessed September 4, 2022, https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/grantham-institute/public/publications/briefing-papers/Evaluating-the-EU-emissions-trading-system_Grantham-BP-21_web.pdf.

with the PRC on climate change is leading to a change in Beijing's policy and intensity in combating global warming. When dealing with the PRC, or any other GHGs emitter, the EU is setting up binding rules around sustainable growth as a core principle and as a ultimate goal of joint or multilateral action to fight climate change. Moreover, the importance of EU's efforts to incentivize the PRC to adopt a similar carbon market trading scheme is highlighted by the ambivalence and inconclusiveness of the PRC's actions to achieve its nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) as we will see below.

In the first place, the EU's norms diffusion toward the PRC is accomplished through informational diffusion. According to Manners, this type of diffusion can be identified in strategic communications and declaratory communications of EU senior officials.[37] In the field of climate change, the EU's first efforts to use the informational channels of norm diffusion in its external relations with the PRC were made in the second half of the 1990s. Since then, a multitude of joint statements and commitments regarding climate change mitigation were adopted and the cooperation projects between the EU and the PRC flourished. Beginning with the 1995 Communication, the EU stressed that "China should be engaged in dialogue and cooperation towards sustainable development and for the protection of the environment".[38] Secondly, sustainable development was established as a goal of the 2003 EU-China Strategic Partnership, together with two other more general objectives of peace and stability. According to this communication one of the goals of EU-PRC relations was to facilitate the PRC's deep integration into the world economy, with the EU supporting it to reform its economy and social system, while also considering the role played by sustainable development in this process.[39] Thirdly, the 2006 Communication dedicated a title to sustainable development and climate change mitigation was one of the main issues discussed under this title.[40] Through this Communication, the EC declared the EU's readiness to share its expertise in the

[37] Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 245

[38] Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission – A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations," *Publications Office of the European Union*, July 5, 1995, accessed March 15, 2021, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0bcbc1c7-2c78-4bba-a027-f67035eeac4f.

[39] Commission of the European Communities, "A maturing partnership – shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations," *EUR-Lex*, September 10, 2003, accessed April 2, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003DC0533&from=EN.

[40] Commission of the European Communities, "EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities," *EUR-Lex*, October 24, 2006, 6, accessed March 16, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0631&from=EN.

field of climate change, as well as in other environmental objectives, and stressed the urgency of using the ETS and clean development mechanisms in order to fulfill the common responsibilities arising from the Kyoto Protocol.[41]

More recently, the press release issued by the European institutions after the EU-PRC Summit in 2020 have shown that the EU leaders considered the PRC a "partner under the Paris Agreement, [who] needs to commit to decisive and ambitious domestic action to reduce emissions in the short term and to set a goal of climate neutrality at the earliest possible date", and were calling on the PRC "to assume greater responsibility in dealing with global challenges through the rules-based international system, promoting international peace and security, and adhering to international standards to support sustainable development, especially in Africa".[42]

These communications are part of the highly institutionalized nature of EU-PRC relations. The annual EU-PRC Summit is the high-level institutional framework that facilitates dialogue between the two and, at the same time, is the framework used by the EU Member States to adopt a common position on Beijing. This institutionalization of the EU-PRC bilateral relation represents the main way in which the procedural diffusion of the norms is achieved. In order to take concerted action on climate change, the EU and the PRC established a Partnership on Climate Change following the 8th EU-PRC Summit in 2005. Today, it represents a sectoral framework for cooperation between the two parties and aims to establish common lines for tackling climate change by "strengthening cooperation and dialogue on climate including clean energy and promote sustainable development".[43]

During the September 2020 EU-China Leaders' Meeting, the EU representatives "encouraged China to strengthen its climate commitments in terms of peaking carbon dioxide emissions and setting the goal of climate neutrality domestically," stressing the urgency for the PRC to launch, as soon as

[41] Ibid.
[42] European Commission, "EU-China Summit: Defending EU interests and values in a complex and vital partnership," June 22, 2020, accessed March 30, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1159.
[43] European Commission, "EU and China Partnership on Climate Change," *European Commission*, September 2, 2005, accessed March 10, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/default/files/international/cooperation/china/docs/joint_declaration_ch_eu_en.pdf.

possible, its national emission trading system.[44] The EU highlighted that the PRC should abandon the construction of other coal-fired power plants both domestically and externally. In the end, the two sides agreed to establish the High-Level Environment and Climate Dialogue to "pursue ambitious joint commitments on these issues."[45]

A third means for the EU to diffuse its norms on climate change is transference. Manners argues that "diffusion takes place when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means," all of these leading to "the exportation of community norms and standards".[46] In the case of the cooperation for the development of ETS systems, the transference works through the use of common initiatives. One of these initiatives is the EU-PRC cooperation project launched in 2017 with the occasion of the introduction of the ETS system in the PRC. This project has been funded by the EU and received a budget of about €10 million.[47] The objectives of this project were to enhance the cooperation on emissions trading in order "to reinforce a political dialogue between the PRC and the EU on the development of emission trading in both constituencies", and to support the PRC in building its national emissions trading system.[48] Additionally, transference diffusion works through bilateral trade. The PRC is the second most important trading partner of the EU, being surpassed only by the US. But the PRC has an advantage over the EU due to its trade surplus, unlike the US with which the EU has a positive trade balance.[49] The EU's trade policy should be considered a powerful tool to diffuse both its norms of sustainable development and those that shape the Chinese ETS system.

Following the measures taken by Brussels in recent years regarding its relationship with Beijing, it can be argued that we are witnessing a new strategic

[44] European Commission, "EU-China Leaders' Meeting: Upholding EU values and interests at the highest level: Joint press release by President Michel, President von der Leyen and Chancellor Merkel," September 14, 2020, accessed March 30, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1648.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 245.
[47] European Commission, "Emissions trading: European Commission and China hold first policy dialogue," April 26, 2018, accessed March 29, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/emissions-trading-european-commission-and-china-hold-first-policy-dialogue_en.
[48] EU-China Emissions Trading System, "Project Introduction," accessed March 30, 2021, https://www.eu-chinaets.org/about-us/project-introduction.
[49] European Parliament, "Fact Sheets on the European Union," October 2020, accessed March 15, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/160/the-european-union-and-its-trade-partners.

repositioning of the EU with regard to the PRC. This new orientation can be defined not only in terms of a strategic cooperation, but also in terms of a "systemic rivalry."[50] We can identify this new approach on the part of the EU in three of the recent EU regulatory frameworks that have direct impact on its relation with the PRC. The first one, the Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CAI), gives a new dimension to the economic relation between the two in the field of foreign direct investments (FDI), the EU wanting to level the playing field between Chinese and European companies through this treaty.[51] The negotiations regarding the CAI were initiated in 2013 and its main purpose was to regulate the bilateral investment issues which defined the current trade relations between the EU and the PRC, involving the terms of market access, the prohibition of forced technology transfers, the non-discrimination by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and regulatory bodies, and the transparency in economic governance.[52]

Regarding the cooperation between the EU and the PRC in the field of climate change mitigation, CAI is in line with the objectives of the new EU Green Deal. The debates that took place in Brussels after the adoption of the PA led to the negotiation and adoption by the EU in 2020 of a climate change action plan that set much more ambitious targets in terms of reducing GHG emissions. This plan called the EU Green Deal stated that the EU and its Member States must make considerable efforts in order to achieve a greenhouse gas reduction of 55% by 2030 and to reach the objective of climate neutrality by 2050. The EU Green Deal has also been an industrial strategy because, beyond decarbonizing the Member States' energy systems, it proposed the development of a less dependent European industry for clean energy products, with an emphasis on hydrogen and the development of the necessary infrastructure for its large-scale use.[53]

---

[50] European Parliament, "EU-China relations in challenging times," October 2021, accessed August 29, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698751/EPRS_BRI(2021)698751_EN.pdf.

[51] European Commission, "Key elements of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment," December 30, 2020, accessed August 30, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2542.

[52] European Parliament, "EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: Levelling the playing field with China,", March 2021, accessed September 5, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/679103/EPRS_BRI(2021)679103_EN.pdf.

[53] EUR-Lex, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe," August 7, 2020, accessed September 13, 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0301.

The fact that the CAI took over some of the provisions of the EU Green Deal that transposed the objectives of the PA, can be seen in Section IV of this agreement, which is entirely dedicated to sustainable development and climate change mitigation.[54] Article 6 of sub-section 2 clearly establishes the fact that the investments made by the two parties of this agreement should lead to "climate change mitigation and adaptation" through the implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the PA, by supporting investments that lead to the realization of climate friendly products, services and technologies, and through bilateral cooperation between the two parties in order to harmonize climate policies in relation to investment-related aspects.[55]

The provisions of the CAI regarding the alignment of the parties to the PA can be considered a spillover from the EU's own domestic approach to sustainable investments which, starting in2019, has taken on new dimensions in order to facilitate the transition towards the EU's climate neutrality by 2050. Thus, on April 15, 2020, the Council adopted the "taxonomy" – a regulation that established a ranking system to encourage private investment in sustainable growth and contribute to a climate-neutral economy.[56] While currently the taxonomy focuses only on financial markets and tools, the regulations it introduced derived from the EU Green Deal itself and reflected the fact that both the use of European funds and the economy as a whole must take into account the targets of this deal. The purpose of adopting the taxonomy was to facilitate resource management supervision in the EU, to ensure that economic activity in all fields meets the EU's high standards on climate and environment. Therefore, we can consider that the EU wanted to outline a unitary approach regarding the sustainability of investments, between those made by domestic economic actors and those made by foreign companies. But despite these similarities, the CAI did not make references to the EU taxonomy or to the PRC's Green Bond Endorsed Projects Catalogue[57] in order to clarify which

[54] European Commission, "EU-China agreement in principle," January 22, 2022, 3-4, accessed August 30, 2022, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/january/tradoc_159346.pdf.
[55] Ibid.
[56] EUR-Lex, "Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088," June 22, 2020, accessed September 6, 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R0852&from =EN.
[57] The Central Bank of the People's Republic of China, "Green Bond Endorsed Projects Catalogue (2021 Edition)", April 21, 2021, accessed September 10, 2022. http://www.pbc.gov.

goods, services and technologies should be supported through the CAI. The possibility to influence an international actor such as the PRC to align with such high standards represented a good opportunity for Brussels to test their attractiveness on a global level, but also the possibility that other EU global warming mitigation mechanisms such as the EU ETS system could be promoted on such a scale. Despite the prolonged bilateral negotiations that took more than eight years, the members of the European Parliament (EP) decided to block the ratification of the CAI in May 2021 following an exchange of sanctions between the EU and the PRC on account of the human rights situation in the Xinjiang region.[58]

The second initiative of the EU that would shape its foreign relations with the PRC is the EU framework for FDIs screening that became operational in October 2020. The FDI screening mechanism represents a tool that can be used by Member States in situations that directly involve national security or that may affect public order.[59] Through this tool, Member States, that have established a national foreign investments screening mechanism, can exchange information and offer solutions to each other regarding FDIs that are made by foreign companies in the EU space. However, although this screening tool is an EU mechanism, Brussels has only an advisory role, through the EC, and cannot directly oppose FDI, as this mechanism does not establish supranational levers.[60] We can argue that the RPC is one of the targets of this mechanism, given the fact that the text establishing this mechanism stipulated that one of the criteria for which a direct investment should be screened is the state-owned enterprise (SOE) character of the targeted company.[61]

In order to achieve its ambitious targets regarding the reduction of GHGs, the EU institutions proposed the Fit for 55 package. This normative package aimed to adapt the EU legislative framework in order to align its policies with

cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/4342400/202109161718008987 9.pdf.

[58] European Parliament, "MEPs refuse any agreement with China whilst sanctions are in place," May 20, 2021, accessed September 5, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210517IPR04123/meps-refuse-any-agreement-with-china-whilst-sanctions-are-in-place.

[59] European Commission, "EU investment screening and export control rules effectively safeguard EU security", September 2, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5286, accessed September 4, 2022.

[60] Francesca Ghiretti,"Screening foreign investment in the EU – the first year," *Mercator Institute for China Studies*, October 21, 2022, accessed September 5, 2022, https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/screening-foreign-investment-eu-first-year.

[61] Ibid.

the targets set by the EU Green Deal.[62] Regarding the EU's internal approach on climate change, the Fit for 55 package aimed at establishing a new EU ETS scheme dedicated to the transport and building sectors. Moreover, the EU pursued the elaboration of new normative acts that will help EU Member States to better promote the use of alternative fuels, that would set new standards regarding the CO2 emissions of motor vehicles, would provide a new framework for energy taxation, and would establish a European social fund dedicated to climate change. Moreover, the Fit for 55 package also addresses the implementation of the carbon border tax (or levy), a customs policy instrument officially referred to as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) – "a carbon price on imports of certain goods outside the EU, if these countries are not ambitious enough about climate change".[63] According to the Environment Members of the EP, this policy is strongly needed in order to "raise global climate ambition and prevent carbon leakage".[64]

As the third policy initiative that has the potential to create an impact on the direction of the EU's political and economic relationship with the PRC, the CBAM was designed to drastically reduce the possibility of parts of the EU industry moving their economic activity outside the region as a result of the price that the EU has to pay for the GHGs emitted. The CBAM also sought to reduce the disadvantages of the European industry in front of the non-EU industries whose activities was not subject to environmental regulations as rigid as those in the EU Member States.[65] This mechanism is in the design period at least until 2023 when the EU will implement a three years reporting and analysis system dedicated to importers who will have to report the direct or indirect emissions generated by the production of goods sold on the EU common market. Subsequently, the EU institutions will make a decision on the final form of the CBAM, on whether it will include only direct emissions or indirect ones as well. From the point of view of the EU-PRC trade relationship, the CBAM

[62] European Council, "Fit for 55," last modified June 30, 2022, accessed September 5, 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/.

[63] European Parliament, "Carbon levy on EU imports needed to raise global climate ambition," last modified February 2, 2021, accessed August 25, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210201IPR96812/carbon-levy-on-eu-imports-needed-to-raise-global-climate-ambition.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Jana Titievskaia, Henrique Morgado Simões and Alina Dobreva, "EU carbon border adjustment mechanism Implications for climate and competitiveness," *European Parliament*, July 2022, 6 accessed September 8, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/698889/EPRS_BRI(2022)698889_EN.pdf .

mechanism has a rather small impact on Chinese exports to the EU Member States due to the fact that the carbon tax on imports targets only products from the iron and steel, aluminum, cement and fertilizers industries.[66] Through this policy it can be considered that the EU wants to set an intrinsic link between the application of the principle of sustainable development in its trade policy and the need for considerable progress in reducing the carbon footprint in the countries from where its Member States import goods. At the same time, by implementing the CBAM, the EU wishes to influence international companies to follow the same rules that apply to companies operating on the European market. Were it to succeed, the EU would limit the emissions of many corporations that operate on a global scale and that have strong economic interests on the European markets.

All these three initiatives (CAI, the EU framework for FDI screening, and the CBAM) are intended to reduce the vulnerabilities of the economies of the EU Member States relative to those economic powers that try to take advantage of their dominant positions on the global markets in order to obtain political and economic advantages without committing fully to fighting global climate change. We can infer this from Beijing's immediate and prompt reaction to the EU's decision to launch the CBAM. The EU is one of the main export markets for Chinese goods and this decision would directly influence the PRC's trade with EU Member States and its strong export-based trade policy. During the Virtual Climate Summit between the PRC, France, and Germany, Xi Jinping criticized the EU carbon border tax plans by arguing that "tackling climate change should […] not become an excuse for geopolitics, attacking other countries or trade barriers".[67] This reaction suggests that Chinese officials believe that the EU is weaponizing its high ambitions on climate change mitigation in order to compete for international markets.

The cultural filter is the fourth type of norm diffusion employed by the EU in its cooperation with the PRC in the field of climate change mitigation. It "affects the impact of international norms and political learning in the third states and organizations leading to learning, adaptation or rejecting of norms" and "is based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by subjects of norm diffusion".[68] In EU's

[66] Ibid., 1-3.
[67] Karl Mathiesen, "China's Xi slams EU carbon border levy plans," *Politico*, April 16, 2021, accessed April 18, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/chinas-xi-seeks-macron-merkel-climate-change-co2-cop26-emisions/.
[68] Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 245.

case, the cultural filter is about "turning the normative communications from a one-way self-centered Eurocentric monologue, into a two-way exchange of ideas and information".[69] This type of approach would allow the EU to avoid negative reactions, resistance, and rejection from those states that might consider European standards to be superior and missionary in nature.[70]

The dissemination of rules from the EU to the PRC is carried out through the cultural filter by sharing knowledge regarding the procedures of setting up and operating the Chinese national ETS system. As we have seen, the EU's ETS system is the biggest and the most efficient in the world and this fact lends it to becoming a model for advanced economies like the PRC. But this does not make Brussels look down on the PRC's efforts to reduce its amount of GHGs emissions. Even if the EU boasts the model of a functional ETS system, in the process of cooperating with the PRC in this field, the EU refers to its Chinese partners as equals, proving their willingness to internalize the good practices of their counterparts. This is obvious in the EU-PRC cooperation program established in order to implement the ETS system in the PRC. This is also clear from the text of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to Enhance Cooperation on Emissions Trading between the EC and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People's Republic of China submitted on July 13, 2018. According to this MoU, the two sides recognize the key role of implementing ETS systems in combating climate change and in enforcing the PA and of establishing the mechanisms for applying this understanding through joint seminars, workshops, and research activities.[71] Cooperation in this matter impacts both the measures adopted by the Chinese government in order to establish a functional ETS system, and also those of the EU ETS system, contributing "to the promotion of carbon markets in general".[72]

The EU has maintained an ongoing dialogue with the Chinese government, providing them with the expertise needed to implement and monitor the PRC's ETS system, but it remains to be seen to what extent it will work like the one implemented at the European level. Given the size of its economy, the PRC has

[69] Natalia Chaban and Sharon Pardo, "Understanding EU External Perceptions: Theorising Local Cultural Filters in the Normative Power Approach (case-study of textbooks)," *Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies* 10, no. 1 (2018): 66.
[70] Ibid.
[71] European Commission, "Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to Enhance Cooperation on Emissions Trading between the European Commission and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People's Republic of China", July 13, 2018, accessed March 30, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/news/20180713_mou_en.pdf.
[72] Ibid.

the potential to become the largest carbon market if, in the future, would apply the ETS to all sectors participating in the national carbon footprint, not just to the energy system.

IV. The Chinese Model of Climate Change Mitigation, between Determination, Ambivalence, and Hesitation

Today the PRC is an important member of the international society, even though it does not always act as an accountable stakeholder in the global affairs as the US, its main competitor, has requested in the past.[73] As a key international stakeholder, its responsibilities include, among others, great efforts to mitigate the global climate change, given the fact that the PRC is a great contributor to the global GHGs emissions. In 2018, alone, the PRC was responsible for 28.5% of global carbon dioxide emissions.[74] However, the story of the PRC's new assertive approach to climate change is a recent one, born out of necessity, and mainly focused on setting its own example in climate crisis management.

During most of the 20th century, GHGs emissions in the PRC were minimal because of its reduced economic industrial activity. The levels of GHG started to rise as a result of the policy of reform and of opening its markets which incentivized and supported the increase in domestic industrial activity and led to a trade policy focused on exports that subsequently generated a boom in manufacturing.[75]

The year 2013 represented a milestone for the Chinese efforts in managing the causes and effects of climate change mainly at the domestic level. The problem that triggered the reaction of the PRC was the impact of intense air pollution on the health of the population of large cities that center on strong industrial activity.[76] By July 2013, the government mobilized investments

[73] Robert Zoellick, "Whither China? From Membership to Responsibility: Remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations," *US Department of State*, September 21, 2005, accessed March 30, 2021, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm.
[74] China Power Team, "How is China Managing its Greenhouse Gas Emissions?," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, July 19, 2018, accessed April 9, 2021, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-greenhouse-gas-emissions/.
[75] Roz Pidcock, "China is responsible for 10% of human influence on climate change, study says," *Carbon Brief,* March 17, 2016, accessed March 23, 2021, https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-is-responsible-for-10-of-human-influence-on-climate-change-study-says.
[76] Herman Wong, "China: The Year in Smog," *The Atlantic*, December 19, 2013, accessed March 15, 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/12/china-the-year-in-smog/282535/.

accounting to $277 billion to fight air pollution in its northern region over the next five years.[77] After this, the Chinese government focused a big part of its foreign policy discourse and actions on the issue of climate change, in order to catch up with the progress made by the international community in this area. Therefore, Beijing has made the strategic decision to reach a leading position in the management of global warming, along with the other major active international actors involved in this matter.

The PRC's determination is a clear sign that it can be a responsible great power in leading the global efforts to decrease the intensity of the temperature rise due to the amount of GHGs in the atmosphere and eventually to put a stop to it. This new approach can be identified in the strategic messages sent by Chinese President Xi Jinping on the importance of applying the PA principles and meet the targets. The current international situation favors the PRC's strategic ambitions in this field and gives it the opportunity to play a greater role in fighting global warming without too many obstacles from the US. The main reason why the US stepped back its global climate change mitigation efforts had to do with the national political leadership whose views and actions were focused more on the wellbeing of the US citizens and economy. The Trump Administration (2017-2021) promoted a policy of economic isolation and contestation of widely accepted international norms and rules, including those that pursue the common global action to fight global climate change. But the US decision to withdraw from the PA[78] and to cease to financially support the developing countries in their endeavors to face climate change did not discourage other great powers to reduce their contribution in order to meet the PA targets. In the following period, Xi Jinping stated the PRC's intention to fill the political void and to be one of the main pillars, alongside the EU, of the international climate change mitigation regime in the absence of US involvement in the global efforts to cut the GHGs emissions in order to limit global warming in line with PA. Even before Trump announcement that the US was withdrawing from the PA, Xi Jinping argued in favor of the enforcing the Agreement saying that it "is a milestone in the history of climate governance. We must ensure this endeavor is not derailed. All parties should work together

[77] J. T. Quigley, "Chinese Government Will Spend $277 Billion to Combat Air Pollution," *The Diplomat*, July 27, 2013, accessed March 10, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2013/07/chinese-government-will-spend-277-billion-to-combat-air-pollution/.
[78] United Nations Climate Change, "Joint Statement on the US Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement," *United Nations Climate Change*, November 20, 2020, accessed August 26, 2022, https://unfccc.int/news/joint-statement-on-the-us-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement.

to implement the Paris Agreement. the PRC will continue to take steps to tackle climate change and fully honor its obligations".[79]

At the Leaders' Summit on Climate conference organized by US President Joe Biden on April 2021[80], which marked the moment of the US *de facto* return to the international climate change regime, Xi Jinping reiterated Beijing's firm commitment to climate change management, as he emphasized the importance of sustainable development, the "multilateral climate governance process", the adherence to the "objectives and principles" of the UNFCCC and of achieving climate neutrality as soon as possible. Xi Jinping also urged the leaders of the 40 states participating at the summit to continue to uphold the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.[81]

In line with the discursive dimension of the PRC's new position on mobilizing international efforts to combat climate change, the Chinese government announced that the PRC will reach its GHGs emissions peak by 2030.[82] Moreover, in 2021, during the 76th UN General Assembly, Xi Jinping declared that the PRC will be carbon neutral by 2060 and promised that the PRC will stop financing the construction of new coal-fired power plants in third countries.[83] In order to achieve these targets, the Chinese government launched the carbon trading program at the end of 2017. This mechanism was introduced in the PRC's 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020), and significantly expanded the global carbon market. It was aimed at the PRC's energy sector, which was primarily based on the use of fossil fuels for energy production.[84] In this regard, the government tested the scheme in its greatest cities by implementing pilot

[79] Xi Jinping, "Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind," *Xinhua*, January 19, 2017, accessed March 25, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-01/19/c_135994707.htm?from=singlemessage.

[80] The White House, "Fact Sheet: President Biden's Leaders' Summit on Climate," *The White House*, April 23, 2022, accessed August 26, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/23/fact-sheet-president-bidens-leaders-summit-on-climate/.

[81] Xi Jinping, "Full Text: Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at Leaders Summit on Climate," *Xinhua*, April 22, 2021, accessed April 25, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/22/c_139899289.htm.

[82] Qi Ye et al., "China's Peaking Emissions, and the Future of Global Climate Policy", Brookings-Tsinghua Public Policy Center, September 12, 2018, accessed April 25, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2018/09/12/chinas-peaking-emissions-and-the-future-of-global-climate-policy/.

[83] UN Affairs, "China headed towards carbon neutrality by 2060; President Xi Jinping vows to halt new coal plants abroad," *UN News*, September 21, 2021, accessed September 13, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100642.

[84] Joseph Romm, *Climate Change: What Everybody Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 182.

programs in Shenzhen, Guangdong, Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Hubei, and Chongqing.[85] As a result, today the PRC is operating the second largest ETS scheme in the world.

Behind these trends of the Chinese policy regarding climate change are also the aspirations of the Chinese leaders to improve the public opinion of the international community regarding the PRC's role in managing the global warming and its impact. By being a more responsible great power in addressing global climate change, the PRC wants to be considered a potential global leader in reducing CO2 emissions and is marketing clean energy products and technologies. The Chinese government sees renewable energy as a major economic opportunity, the PRC being now the world leading producer, investor, and consumer of renewable energy,[86] after it emerged as the dominant producer of solar PV panels in 2008.[87]

Against the background of increasing its own ambitions regarding the fight against climate change, the government in Beijing launched, starting 2011, through the 12th Five Year Plan, a new industrial policy that would led to a sharp development in the Chinese market of energy equipment and renewable technologies in the following five-year period. Through the support given by the Chinese government to R&D, to the producers of renewable energy products, and to their placement on the Chinese market, these measures led to an oversaturation of the domestic market of renewable energy products, a phenomenon that determined the Chinese producers of such products to look for and to access new markets.[88] During the same period, in the EU, the promotion of renewable energy sources occupied a central place in the measures undertook by the EC regarding the fight against climate change. These measures were benefiting from financial support from the EU funds.[89]

---

[85] Zhang Lu, Zeng Yi and Li Dayuan, "China's Emissions Trading Scheme: First Evidence on Pilot Stage," *Polish Journal of Environmental Studies* 28, no. 2 (2018).
[86] Sarah Ladislaw and Nikos Tsafos, "Beijing Is Winning the Clean Energy Race," *Foreign Policy*, October 2, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/02/china-clean-energy-technology-winning-sell/, accessed March 11, 2021.
[87] Thomas Sattich et al., "Renewable energy in EU-China relations: Policy interdependence and its geopolitical implications," *Energy Policy* 156 (September 2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112456 .
[88] Ibid.
[89] EUR-Lex, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Renewable Energy: A Major Player in the European Energy Market," June 6, 2012, accessed September 13, 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52012DC0271 .

This development led the EU markets to be flooded with PV panels manufactured in the PRC and sold at dumping prices. After an investigation by the EC on the Chinese PV panels producers who were active on the European market, it was discovered that many of them were directly subsidized by the Chinese state. This phenomenon represented a direct threat to the competitiveness of European producers in this sector. According to the EC report the "fair value of a Chinese solar panel sold to Europe should actually [have been] 88% higher than the price to which it is sold", and as a consequence, in 2013, the EU imposed temporary import duties on solar panels and wind turbines imported from the PRC.[90]

The EU is aware of its asymmetric dependence on the PRC regarding the renewable energy products such as solar panels.[91] The PRC is currently the largest import partner of the EU in terms of green energy products, including wind turbines, solar panels, and liquid biofuels.[92] The EU is trying to eliminate some of its vulnerabilities in relation to the PRC through mechanisms such as the CAI, the screening mechanism for FDI, or the CBAM and in this process it can try to convince the Chinese leaders to increase their efforts toward climate change mitigation. But except for the CBAM, the other two EU initiatives goals are not primarily designed to enforce the EU Green Deal. There are voices that claim that there is a possibility that the EU Member States will not be able to achieve their targets for reducing GHG and increase the share of energy from renewable sources established by the EU Green Deal unless they rely on the Chinese producers of renewables, as the economies of European industrial powers such as France and Germany are still quite underdeveloped in this sector to support such a demand.[93] Regarding the PV panel industry, according to an EP Brief, there is a solution to avoid prolonging this situation. According to this

[90] European Commission, "EU imposes provisional anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese solar panels," June 4, 2013, accessed September 13, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_501.

[91] Kjeld van Wieringen and Julia Hüntemann, "Making solar a source of EU energy security," *European Parliament*, July 2022, accessed September 13, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/733587/EPRS_ATA(2022)733587_EN.pdf.

[92] Eurostat, "International trade in products related to green energy," October 2021, accessed September 10, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_products_related_to_green_energy&oldid=551639#Solar_panels:_China_largest_import_partner.2C_United_States_largest_export_partner.

[93] Roderick Kefferpütz, "Green Deal Reloaded – Why the European Climate Policy Won't Happen Without China," *Institut Montaigne*, April 21, 2021, accessed September 13, 2022, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/green-deal-reloaded-why-european-climate-policy-wont-happen-without-china.

Brief, the EU must "monitor the supply chain, to steer strategic discussions on the trade-off between strategic autonomy and the Green Deal and to encourage access to international investors and R&D institutes."[94]

In parallel, the PRC's efforts to "green" its industrial policy were not discouraged and the *Made in China 2025* initiative was announced in May 2015 by the State Council. It was guided by the principles of promoting innovation, quality of products, and green development and its objectives were to transform the Chinese industry and to reduce PRC's dependence on high-tech product supply chains from third countries.[95] This objective should contribute to a broader one which has the year 2049 as its target, when the PRC's industry is expected to become the most powerful in the world and at the same time a hub of high-tech products.[96]

The green transformation of the production processes of the PRC industry through Made in China 2025 has the role of reducing energy and resource consumption in these processes. In order to be able to measure the extent to which the PRC industry has become greener as a result of the implementation of Made in China 2025, the Chinese government has established the reduction of energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, water use, and the rate of solid waste emitted by the industry as the key performance indicators related to the industrial sector.[97] The Chinese government expects that these savings will improve the prospects of the PRC regarding compliance with its own commitments to the PA and will lead to the reduction of GHG and other polluting gases resulting from industrial processes.[98]

At the same time, the share of renewables in the energy mix of the PRC is considerable, but not enough. Even though the solar panels and wind turbines produced in the PRC cover a large part of the global renewable equipment markets and 1 of 3 solar panels and 1 of 3 wind turbines are operating today on Chinese territory, the renewables represent only 15,3% of the PRC's energy

[94] van Wieringen and Hüntemann, "Making solar a source of EU energy security".
[95] Max J. Zenglein and Anna Holzmann, "Evolving Made in China 2025. China's industrial policy in the quest for global tech leadership," *MERICS Papers on China*, no. 8, July 2019, 19-20, accessed September 13, 2022, https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/MPOC%20Made%20%20in%20China%202025.pdf.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Institute for Security & Development Policy, "Made in China 2025," June 2018, accessed September 13, 2020, https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2018/06/Made-in-China-Backgrounder.pdf.
[98] Frida Lia et al., "Green Reformation of Chinese Traditional Manufacturing Industry: Approach and Potential for Cooperation," *Procedia Manufacturing* 43 (2020): 289-290.

producing capacities.[99] The biggest share in the PRC's energy mix is represented by the "dirty" energy resulted from coal (57,7%).[100]

In order to earn international credibility, the PRC needs to phase out its coal energy production capacities as soon as possible in order to sustain its status as one of the global leaders of green transition and climate change mitigation. There is international pressure on the PRC to decarbonize more quickly, and this comes now from the US, because the US President, Joe Biden, recently reasserted America's leadership in fighting climate change, recommitting the US to the PA and promising investments worth $2 trillion in clean energy initiatives.[101] The current EU's strategic reorientation towards the PRC should represent another convincing incentive, at first glance, for Beijing to take ambitious measures to reduce the carbon-intensive character of its economy. The CBAM can be considered an instrument by which Brussels is trying to determine Beijing to decrease the dependence of its economy and energy sector on coal and become a true global partner in the fight against climate change.

Despite some arguments such as that of the spokesperson of the PRC's Ministry of Ecology and Environment, Liu Youbin, that criticized the CBAM by declaring that it is "essentially a unilateral measure to extend the climate change issue to the trade sector. It violates WTO principles ... and (will) seriously undermine mutual trust in the global community and the prospects for economic growth", the Chinese officials should consider this EU measure as an opportunity to test the ability of the Chinese industry, especially the construction industry, to adapt to the environmental rigors of the EU markets that are so important for many Chinese companies.

The steel sector is one of the most polluting in the construction industry in the PRC, and it annually produces half of the world's steel products.[102] In 2019, a percentage of 7.3 of the total quantity of steel produced in the PRC was

[99] China Power Team, "How Is China's Energy Footprint Changing?," *Center for Strategic and International Studies,* February 15, 2016, accessed April 25, 2021, https://chinapower.csis.org/energy-footprint/.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Jim Tankersley, "Biden Details $2 Trillion Plan to Rebuild Infrastructure and Reshape the Economy," *New York Times*, April 21, 2021, accessed April 25, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/business/economy/biden-infrastructure-plan.html.
[102] Eurostat, "International trade in goods by type of good," June 2022, accessed September 10, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_goods_by_type_of_good&oldid=545568#International_trade_in_goods_-_developments_by_broad_economic_category.

exported.[103] At the same time, the steel produced by the Chinese companies is extremely "dirty", this industry generating 15% of the national GHG emissions.[104] Of the total iron and steel imported by the EU Member States, only 6.6% represent imports originating from the PRC, compared to those from Russia which total 15%. Despite this low percentage, steel exports from the PRC to the EU have been substantial enough to cause the PRC to include even steel industries in the national ETS scheme. This was even considered by the PRC's Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) which, through the 14th Five Year Plan, wanted to expand the ETS scheme beyond the energy sector, and therefore to include the more carbon-intensive industrial sectors as well, and steel was one of them.[105] According to the Mercator Institute for China Studies, in the PRC, in addition to the criticism of CBAM, there were also points of view that supported the intensification of cooperation efforts between the EU and the PRC, so as to establish a global carbon market and avoid CBAM-related normative rigidity.[106]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has another instrument through which the PRC tests and practices its climate diplomacy. In order to enhance the green dimension of the BRI, the Chinese government established rules in order to make the BRI foreign investments more sustainable among which there were the "Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road", "The Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan", the "BRI International Green Development Coalition", and the "Green Investment Principles for the Belt and Road".[107] Although in the nine years since Xi Jinping launched the BRI, several cooperation platforms have been promoted in order to support

[103] International Trade Administration, "Steel Exports Report: China," *Global Steel Trade Monitor*, May 2020, accessed September 13, 2022, https://legacy.trade.gov/steel/countries/pdfs/exports-china.pdf.
[104] Jialin Shen et al. "Future CO2 emission trends and radical decarbonization path of iron and steel industry in China," *Journal of Cleaner Production* 326, no. 1 (2021), accessed September 8, 2022, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652621035381.
[105] Nicholas Stern and Chunping Xie, "China's new growth story: linking the 14th Five-Year Plan with the 2060 carbon neutrality pledge," *Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies* (2022): 13-14.
[106] Barbara Pongratz, "EU-China climate policy – balancing cooperation and pressure," *Mercator Institute for China Studies*, July 31, 2021, accessed September 14, 2022, https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/eu-china-climate-policy-balancing-cooperation-and-pressure.
[107] Christina Sadeler, "Climate change as an area for EU-China cooperation?," in *Shifting Power and Human Rights Diplomacy: China*, ed. David Ismangil, Karen van der Schaaf, and Stijn Deklerck (Netherlands: Amnesty International Netherlands, February 2020), 94, accessed September 14, 2022, https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2020/02/STATEGIC-STUDIES-CHINA_webversie.pdf?x33308

sustainable investment and development as guiding principles of the PRC's initiative, in practice things stand different.

In the BRI partner countries, the PRC has been developing several energy projects based on coal-fired electricity generation. Indonesia, as well as countries on the European continent such as Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina[108], are among the countries where Chinese companies are developing such projects that in the end undercut Beijing's rhetoric that BRI should be sustainable or green. If the PRC does not completely reshape the BRI investment policy, its partner countries will account for more than half of global carbon dioxide emissions by 2050.[109] The first steps in this direction were made in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In the first case, Pakistan, which had originally reached an agreement with the PRC to develop coal-fired energy production capacity, recently announced through its former prime minister, Imran Kahn, that it was abandoning these projects in order to develop green energy capacity.[110] As for Bangladesh, according to the Green Belt and Road Initiative Center, in February 2021, the PRC's embassy in Bangladesh notified the local Ministry of Finance that "the Chinese side shall no longer consider projects with high pollution and high energy consumption, such as coal mining [and] coal-fired power stations".[111]

Even if the Chinese government has relied at the national level on a gradual elimination of coal by 2060, foreign investments in dirty infrastructure projects in states that more or less need such aid, generate a mismatch between compliance with PA guidelines and the implementation of NDCs while supporting BRI partner states to achieve the same climate change targets all signatories pledged to.

[108] Pippa Gallop, Ioana Ciuta, and Wawa Wang, "Chinese-built coal projects in Europe: A real and immediate threat to the EU's decarbonisation efforts," *Bankwatch Network*, September 14, 2020, 2 accessed April 29, 2021, https://bankwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/china-projects-briefing-Sept-2020.pdf.
[109] Simon Zadek and Ma Jun, "A Low-Carbon Belt and Road," *Project Syndicate,* March 28, 2019, accessed April 29, 2021, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/climate-change-belt-and-road-infrastructure-investment-by-ma-jun-and-simon-zadek-2019-03?barrier=accesspaylog.
[110] Sebastien Goulard, "Pakistan is following China on green path," *OBOR Europe*, December 21, 2020, accessed April 29, 2021, https://www.oboreurope.com/en/pakistan-china-green-path/.
[111] Jennifer Hillman and Alex Tippett, "The Climate Challenge and China's Belt and Road Initiative*," Council on Foreign Relation*, March 2020, 31, accessed April 29, 2021.

V. Conclusions

The EU has the ability to influence a major power such as the PRC to adapt its economic policies to reduce their impact on the climate. In its relations with the PRC, the EU is imposing its normative power through dialogue and the institutionalization of its relationship with Beijing, but also by shaping a common identity as global leaders in fighting climate change. The EU is in an ongoing dialogue with the Chinese government, offering them the expertise needed to implement and monitor the PRC's ETS system, but it remains to be seen to what extent it will work like the one set up at European level. It is well known that the PRC has a strong voice on the domestic markets, including those related to the carbon market trading system like the energy sector. Given the size of its economy, the PRC has the potential to become the largest carbon market globally if it applies the ETS in the future to all sectors participating in the national carbon footprint, not just the energy system. At the rhetorical level, the PRC's ambitions and determination seem quite convincing and, at the same time, could represent an approach worth following by other developing countries. But, as we have seen, things are not as clean cut as the Chinese leaders would like them to make out to be.

Regarding climate change mitigation, the transference type of norm diffusion is very prominent in the exercise of the EU's normative powers over the PRC due to the complex commercial relations between the two and to the efforts that Brussels makes to regulate them primarily in order to maintain a competitive economic environment in the EU and secondly to induce the PRC to adopt equally ambitious economic and environmental standards. The EU's strategic reorientation towards the PRC will not offer Beijing many options, as the Chinese leaders will be faced with a situation in which they must intensify cooperation with Brussels in the field of climate change in order to avoid the possible effects of the CBAM and mitigate the impact of an ever ambitious EU Green Deal.

The ambivalence of the PRC's climate change policy, coupled with the tension between the needs of an energy-consuming economy and the unbroken desire to assert itself as a global leader in this field make the PRC's NP to be perceived as partial and fragile, as it is not enough to give the PRC influence in the international processes setting targets and rules aimed at stopping negative climate developments and their impact on humanity. When we are considering

the international cooperation between the PRC and other BRI participants, it is obvious that the Chinese side needs to do more than advance a political rhetoric favorable to increasing the global efforts of fighting climate change. Abroad, the PRC needs to apply the BRI more on sustainable investments.

All things considered, one aspect in particular is thought-provoking and could be the subject of a wider discussion to develop the subject of this paper. On the one hand, the PRC is a developing state. Beijing embraces and accepts this status in multiple situations. By positioning itself in the category of states that need special conditions to continue their process of modernization and economic development, the PRC can adopt a more relaxed policy on reducing GHG emissions, as a tightening in measures might slow its pace of development which, in turn, can have dangerous social and political implications for the political leadership of the state. On the other hand, the PRC wants to be one of the leading states in combating climate change, both politically and economically. However, this position presupposes a responsible attitude domestically and internationally, based on sound and clearly defined principles, as well as the ability to influence countries such as Pakistan to abandon unsustainable policies. In the current international regime for climate change mitigation the PRC's potential NP lies rather in the strength of its example based on its ability to develop and implement green energy technologies and export them to the world market and less in its regulatory power.

The result of the constant cooperation between Brussels and Beijing influenced only partially the PRC to become a major and responsible player in managing the global climate change challenges, failing, at various times, to follow the European high standards on climate change on the global stage.

REFERENCES

- Bradford, Anu. *The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
- Chaban, Natalia, and Sharon Pardo. "Understanding EU External Perceptions: Theorising Local Cultural Filters in the Normative Power Approach (case-study of textbooks)." *Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies* 10, no. 1 (2018): 64-78.
- China Power Team. "How Is China's Energy Footprint Changing?". *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. February 15, 2016. Accessed April 25, 2021. https://chinapower.csis.org/energy-footprint/.

- China Power Team. "How is China Managing its Greenhouse Gas Emissions?" *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. July 19, 2018. Accessed April 9, 2021. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-greenhouse-gas-emissions/.
- Commission of the European Communities. "A maturing partnership – shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations." *EUR-Lex: EU law*. September 10, 2003. Accessed April 2, 2021. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003DC0533&from=EN.
- Commission of the European Communities. "Communication from the Commission – A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations." *Publications Office of the European Union*. July 5, 1995. Accessed March 15, 2021. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0bcbc1c7-2c78-4bba-a027-f67035eeac4f.
- Commission of the European Communities. "EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities." *EUR-Lex: EU Law*. October 24, 2006. Accessed March 16, 2021. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0631&from=EN.
- Convery, Frank J. "Origins and Development of the EU ETS." *Environmental and Resource Economics* 43, no. 3 (2009): 391–412.
- EU-China Emissions Trading System. "Project Introduction." Accessed March 30, 2021. https://www.eu-chinaets.org/about-us/projectintroduction.
- EUR-Lex. "Treaty of Amsterdam." October 2, 1997. Accessed March 17, 2021. https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/default/files/docs/body/treaty_of_amsterdam_en.pdf.
- EUR-Lex. "Treaty of Lisbon." December 17, 2007. Accessed March 22, 2021. http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/688a7a98-3110-4ffe-a6b3-8972d8445325.0007.01/DOC_19.
- EUR-Lex. "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Renewable Energy: A Major Player in the European Energy Market." June 6, 2012. Accessed September 13, 2022. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52012DC0271.
- EUR-Lex. "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union." October 26, 2012. Accessed March 26, 2021. https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

- EUR-Lex. "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union." October 26, 2012. Accessed March 15, 2021. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=ro.
- EUR-Lex. "Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088." June 22, 2020. Accessed September 6, 2022. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R0852&from=EN.
- EUR-Lex. "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe." August 7, 2020. Accessed September 13, 2022. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0301.
- European Commission. "Effort sharing 2021-2030: targets and flexibilities." n.d. Accessed August 27, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/effort-sharing-member-states-emission-targets/effort sharing-2021-2030-targets-and-flexibilities_en.
- European Commission. "EU and China Partnership on Climate Change." September 2, 2005. Accessed March 10, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/default/files/international/cooperation/china/docs/joint_declaration_ch_eu_en.pdf.
- European Commission. "EU imposes provisional anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese solar panels." June 4, 2013. Accessed September 13, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_501.
- European Commission. "Emissions trading: European Commission and China hold first policy dialogue." April 26, 2018. Accessed March 29, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/emissions-trading-european-commission-and-china-hold-first-policy-dialogue_en.
- European Commission. "EU-China Summit: Defending EU interests and values in a complex and vital partnership." June 22, 2020. Accessed March 30, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1159.

- European Commission. "Key elements of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment." December 30, 2020. Accessed August 30, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2542.
- European Commission. "EU-China Leaders' Meeting: Upholding EU values and interests at the highest level: Joint press release by President Michel, President von der Leyen and Chancellor Merkel." September 14, 2020. Accessed March 30, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1648.
- European Commission. "EU-China agreement in principle." January 22, 2022. Accessed August 30, 2022. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/january/tradoc_159346.pdf.
- European Commission. "EU investment screening and export control rules effectively safeguard EU security." September 2, 2022. Accessed September 4, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5286.
- European Council. "Presidency Conclusions: Goteborg European Council." June 15 and 16, 2001. Accessed March 27, 2021. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20983/00200-r1en1.pdf.
- European Council. "Fit for 55." Last modified June 30, 2022. Accessed September 5, 2022. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/.
- European Court of Auditors. "Energy taxation, carbon pricing and energy subsidies." 2022. Accessed September 4, 2022. https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/RW22_01/RW_Energy_taxation_EN.pdf
- European Parliament. "Lisbon European Council." March 24, 2000. Accessed March 25, 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm.
- European Parliament. "Fact Sheets on the European Union." October 2020. Accessed March 15, 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/160/the-european-union-and-its-trade-partners.
- European Parliament. "EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: Levelling the playing field with China." March 2021. Accessed September 5, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/679103/EPRS_BRI(2021)679103_EN.pdf .

- European Parliament. "Carbon levy on EU imports needed to raise global climate ambition." February 2, 2021. Accessed August 25, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210201IPR96812/carbon-levy-on-eu-imports-needed-to-raise-global climate-ambition.
- European Parliament. "MEPs refuse any agreement with China whilst sanctions are in place." May 20, 2021. Accessed September 5, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210517IPR04123/meps-refuse-any-agreement-with-china-whilst-sanctions-are-in-place.
- European Parliament. "EU-China relations in challenging times." October 2021. Accessed August 29, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698751/EPRS_BRI(2021)698751_EN.pdf.
- Eurostat. "International trade in products related to green energy." October 2021. Accessed September 10, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_products_related_to_green_energy&oldid=551639#Solar_panels:_China_largest_import_partner.2C_United_States_largest_export_partner.
- Eurostat. "International trade in goods by type of good." June 2022. Accessed September 10, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_goods_by_type_of_good&oldid=545568#International_trade_in_goods__developments_by_broad_economic_category.
- Falker, Robert. "The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics." *International Affairs* 92, no. 5 (2016): 1107–1125.
- Gallop, Pippa, Ioana Ciuta, and Wawa Wang. "Chinese-built coal projects in Europe: A real and immediate threat to the EU's decarbonisation efforts." *Bankwatch Network*. September 14, 2020. Accessed April 29, 2021. https://bankwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/china-projects-briefing-Sept-2020.pdf.
- General Assembly of the United Nations. "3202 (S-VI). Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order". *UN Documents*. May 1, 1974, Accessed August 20, 2022. http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3202.htm.
- Ghiretti, Francesca. "Screening foreign investment in the EU – the first year." *Mercator Institute for China Studies*. October 21, 2022. Accessed

September 5, 2022. https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/screening-foreign-investment-eu-first-year .

- Goulard, Sebastien. "Pakistan is following China on green path." *OBOR Europe*. December 21, 2020. Accessed April 29, 2021. https://www.oboreurope.com/en/pakistan-china-green-path/.
- Hillman, Jennifer, and Alex Tippett. "The Climate Challenge and China's Belt and Road Initiative." *Council on Foreign Relations*. March 2020, 31. Accessed April 29, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/blog/climate-challenge-and-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative.
- Institute for Security & Development Policy. "Made in China 2025." June 2018. Accessed September 13, 2020. https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2018/06/Made-in-China-Backgrounder.pdf.
- Investigate Europe. "EU Emissions Trading Scheme Explained". August 6, 2020. Accessed March 17, 2021. https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/2020/eu-emissions-trading-scheme-explained/?ie_s=ga&pk_campaign=en_dsa&pk_source=google&pk_medium=cpc&gclid=Cj0KCQjw1PSDBhDbARIsAPeTqrddxPrkNSwnhQYLKqSsE43T0WfJROZ5VCJ7XCkjdPgTIpu0fV9W8xIaAtL6EALw_wcB.
- International Trade Administration. "Steel Exports Report: China." *Global Steel Trade Monitor*. May 2020. Accessed September 13, 2022. https://legacy.trade.gov/steel/countries/pdfs/exports-china.pdf.
- Jinping, Xi. "Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind." *Xinhua*. January 19, 2017. Accessed March 25, 2021. http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-01/19/c_135994707.htm?from=singlemessage.
- Jinping, Xi. "Full Text: Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at Leaders' Summit on Climate." *Xinhua*. April 22, 2021. Accessed April 25, 2021. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/22/c_139899289.htm.
- Kefferpütz, Roderick. "Green Deal Reloaded – Why the European Climate Policy Won't Happen Without China." *Institut Montaigne*. April 21, 2021. Accessed September 13, 2022. https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/green-deal-reloaded-why-european-climate-policy-wont-happen-without-china.
- Krolikowski, Alanna. "Brittle China? Economic and Political Fragility with Global Implications." *Global Policy* 8, no. 4 (June 2017): 42-53.

- Ladislaw, Sarah, and Nikos Tsafos. "Beijing Is Winning the Clean Energy Race." *Foreign Policy*. October 2, 2020. Accessed March 11, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/02/china-clean-energy-technology-winning-sell/.
- Lia Frida, Tao Zhanga, Qian Shab, Xin Peib, Yizhi Songb, Chao Li. "Green Reformation of Chinese Traditional Manufacturing Industry: Approach and Potential for Cooperation." *Procedia Manufacturing* 43 (2020): 285-292.
- Lu, Zhang, Zeng Yi, and Li Dayuan. "China's Emissions Trading Scheme: First Evidence on Pilot Stage." *Polish Journal of Environmental Studies* 28, no. 2 (2018): 543-551.
- Manners, Ian. "The EU's Normative Power in Changing World Politics." In *Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion*, edited by Andre Gerrits, 9-24. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2009. Accessed August 27, 2022, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20091200_cesp_paper_gerrits.pdf.
- Manners, Ian. "The normative ethics of the European Union." *International Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2008): 45-60.
- Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?". *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): 235-258.
- Mathiesen, Karl. "China's Xi slams EU carbon border levy plans." *Politico*. April 16, 2021. Accessed April 18, 2021. https://www.politico.eu/article/chinas-xi-seeks-macron-merkel-climate-change-co2-cop26-emisions/
- McGrath, Matt. "Climate change: China aims for 'carbon neutrality by 2060"'. *BBC*. September 22, 2020. Accessed March 14, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54256826.
- Muuls, Mirabelle, Jonathan Colmer, Ralf Martin, and Ulrich J. Wagner. "Evaluating the EU Emissions Trading System: Take it or leave it? An assessment of the data after ten years." Grantham Institute Briefing paper, no. 21, October 2016. Accessed September 4, 2022. https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/grantham-institute/public/publications/briefing-papers/Evaluating-the-EU-emissions-trading-system_Grantham-BP-21_web.pdf.
- O'Neill, Kate. *The Environment and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Pidcock, Roz. "China is responsible for 10% of human influence on climate change, study says." *Carbon Brief*. March 17, 2016. Accessed March 23, 2021. https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-is-responsible-for-10-of-

human-influence-on-climate-change-study-says.

- Pongratz, Barbara. "EU-China climate policy – balancing cooperation and pressure." *Mercator Institute for China Studies*. July 31, 2021. Accessed September 14, 2022. https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/eu-china-climate-policy-balancing-cooperation-and-pressure.
- Quigley, J. T. "Chinese Government Will Spend $277 Billion to Combat Air Pollution," *The Diplomat*. July 27, 2013. Accessed March 10, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2013/07/chinese-government-will-spend-277-billion-to-combat-air-pollution/.
- Romm, Joseph. *Climate Change: What Everybody Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Sadeler, Christina. "Climate change as an area for EU-China cooperation?". In *Shifting Power and Human Rights Diplomacy: China*, edited by David Ismangil, Karen van der Schaaf, and Stijn Deklerck, 85-98. Netherlands: Amnesty International Netherlands, February 2020. Accessed September 14, 2022. https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2020/02/STATEGIC-STUDIES-CHINA_webversie.pdf?x33308.
- Sattich, Thomas, Duncan Freeman, Daniel Scholtencan, and Shaohua Yan. "Renewable energy in EU-China relations: Policy interdependence and its geopolitical implications." *Energy Policy* 156 (September 2021). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112456.
- Shen, Jialin, Qi Zhang, Lisong Xu, Shuoshuo Tian, Peng Wang. "Future CO2 emission trends and radical decarbonization path of iron and steel industry in China." *Journal of Cleaner Production* 326, no. 1 (2021). Accessed September 8, 2022. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652621035381.
- Solis, Mireya. "China, Japan, and the Art of Economic Statecraft." *Brookings*. February 2020. Accessed August 27, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FP_202002__china_japan_solis.pdf .
- Stern, Nicholas, and Chunping Xie. "China's new growth story: linking the 14th Five-Year Plan with the 2060 carbon neutrality pledge." *Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies* (2020): 1-20.
- Tankersley, Jim. "Biden Details $2 Trillion Plan to Rebuild Infrastructure and Reshape the Economy." *New York Times*. April 21, 2021. Accessed April 25, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/business/economy/biden-infrastructure-plan.html.

- The Central Bank of the People's Republic of China. "Green Bond Endorsed Projects Catalogue (2021 Edition)." April 21, 2021. Accessed September 10, 2022. http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/4342400/2021091617180089879.pdf.
- The White House. "Fact Sheet: President Biden's Leaders' Summit on Climate." April 23, 2022. Accessed August 26, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/23/fact-sheet-president-bidens-leaders-summit-on-climate/.
- The World Bank. "Carbon Pricing Dashboard." n.d. Accessed September 4, 2022. https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/map_data.
- The World Bank. "European Union". 2022. Accessed August 27, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=EU.
- Titievskaia, Jana, Henrique Morgado Simões, and Alina Dobreva. "EU carbon border adjustment mechanism Implications for climate and competitiveness." E*uropean Parliament*. July 2022. Accessed September 8, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/698889/EPRS_BRI(2022)698889_EN.pdf.
- Tuominen, Hanna. "The Changing Context of Global Governance and the Normative Power of the European Union." In *Global Power Europe - Vol. 1*, edited by Astrid Boening and Jan-Frederik Kremer, 201-218. Heidelberg: Springer, 2013.
- United Nations – Climate Change. "Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification." n.d. Accessed March 20, 2021. https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification.
- United Nations Climate Change. "Joint Statement on the US Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement." November 20, 2020. Accessed August 26, 2022. https://unfccc.int/news/joint-statement-on-the-us-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement.
- van Wieringen, Kjeld, and Julia Hüntemann. "Making solar a source of EU energy security." *European Parliament*. July 2022. Accessed September 13, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/733587/EPRS_ATA(2022)733587_EN.pdf.
- Wates, Jeremy. *A carbon pricing blueprint for the EU*. Brussels: European Environmental Bureau, 2021. Accessed August 27, 2022. https://eeb.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/A-Carbon-Pricing-Blueprint-for-the-EU2.pdf.

- Wong, Herman. "China: The Year in Smog." *The Atlantic*. December 19, 2013. Accessed March 15, 2021. https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/12/china-the-year-in-smog/282535/.
- Ye, Qi, Nicholas Stern, He Jiankun, Lu Jiaqi, David King, Liu Tianle, Wu Tong. "China's Peaking Emissions, and the Future of Global Climate Policy". *Brookings-Tsinghua Public Policy Center*. September 12, 2018. Accessed April 25, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2018/09/12/chinas-peaking-emissions-and-the-future-of-global-climate-policy/.
- Zadek, Simon, and Ma Jun. "A Low-Carbon Belt and Road." *Project Syndicate*. March 28, 2019. Accessed April 29, 2021. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/climate-change-belt-and-road-infrastructure-investment-by-ma-jun-and-simon-zadek-2019-03?barrier=accesspaylog.
- Zenglein, Max J., and Anna Holzmann. "Evolving Made in China 2025. China's industrial policy in the quest for global tech leadership." *MERICS Papers on China*, no. 8. July 2019. Accessed September 13, 2022. https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/MPOC%20Made%20%20in%20China%202025.pdf.
- Zoellick, Robert. "Whither China? From Membership to Responsibility: Remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations." *US Department of State*. September 21, 2005. Accessed March 30, 2021. https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm.